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The relationship between religion and politics is explored from
a theoretical standpoint, assuming that religious clerics can be co-
opted by the ruler acting as an autocrat. The comparative effects
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that the presence of a decentralized body of clerics makes autocratic
regimes more unstable. It also shows that in time of stability, the
level of reforms is larger with a centralized religion than with a de-
centralized one. When the autocrat in the decentralized case pushes
more reforms than in the centralized one, he always does so at the
cost of stability. Historical case studies are presented that serve to
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1 Introduction
This paper is an exploration into the relationship between (autocratic) pol-
itics and religion in the context of non-secularized developing countries. It
looks at the instrumentalization of religion by an autocratic ruler concerned
with the stability of his hold on power as well as by reforms enriching him
and his entourage. It compares two types of religious structure: centralized
and decentralized. The exercise is mainly theoretical but it is inspired by
history in the sense that the assumptions on which the theory is based and
the analytical questions addressed are drawn from our knowledge of the
relationship between politics and religion both in countries that are now
advanced and in currently developing countries.
As current observation testifies, few developing countries turn out to be
genuine democracies. This was more evident in the 1960s and 1970s than
today, especially when attention is focused on Latin America and Africa. It
nevertheless remains true in a large part of the developing world where po-
litical regimes prevail that lack some basic attributes of democracy. This is
especially evident in Asia where India is standing almost alone in the demo-
cratic category. It also bears emphasis that latecomers in the industrial
revolution (Germany, Russia, and Japan) during the 19th and beginning
of the 20th centuries were not governed in a democratic way. Moreover,
many old democracies of Western Europe, with the notable exception of
the Netherlands, started as absolute monarchies. What all this evidence
suggests, therefore, is that modern states tend to be non-democratic during
the crucial phase of their formation and consolidation.
Since their legitimacy cannot rest on the principles of democracy, de-
veloping autocracies need to rely on other sources. Because of its reference
to the sacred sphere of life, religion provides a transcendental legitimacy
which the autocrat may seek in support of his rule. This may be a par-
ticularly effective strategy in traditional societies where the influence of
religion is pervasive due to low rates of urbanization and low education
levels of the majority of people. The experience of Europe, most notably
in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, attests to the importance of a
strategy based on a strong identification with a particular religion and on
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the ruling principle ’cuius regio eius religio’ according to which a citizen
should have the same religion as the sovereign (Kaplan, 2007). Since the
latter rule implies that not espousing the sovereign’s faith is tantamount
to betraying one’s country, it is actually quite difficult to disentangle the
two sources of loyalty, at least in the case of modern Europe (both Western
and Eastern). The same principle is still observed in a significant num-
ber of developing countries where members of the religious establishment
believe it to be their duty to obey a secular ruler, however despotic and
corrupt, provided that he proclaims official allegiance to their religion. This
was particularly evident with Catholicism in many Latin American coun-
tries during the 1960s and 1970s, with Islam in many Muslim countries,
and even with Budhism in times of crisis (e.g., during and after the Tamil
rebellion in Sri Lanka).
In order to gain religious legitimacy, however, it is not actually sufficient
that an autocrat officially proclaims his adherence to a particular religion.
He must also strive toward co-opting religious clerics with the purpose
of obtaining support for his policies by means of legitimating statements
or speeches. But, unlike the first, purely declamatory component of the
strategy, co-option involves a cost: religious clerics have to be bought into
submission, implying that rewards and privileges must be granted to them
in exchange for their cooperation. The ideal situation seems to be when
the clerical body is unified under a centralized church structure headed by
an undisputed authority, and that authority stands rather close to polit-
ical power. This situation prevailed in many European countries in the
17-18th centuries (e.g., France, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden,
Hungary, Italy) while it has been deliberately created as the consequence
of a schismatic break with a foreign church in some others (most notably,
England during Henry VIII’s reign). Completely different is the situation
where there is no vertical chain of command but a decentralized clerical
structure. Since clerics have different levels of attachment to the ethical
values and moral principles inspired by their religion (they have diferent
income-value preferences) and, therefore, different tastes for the autocrat’s
policies, it is not a priori clear which fraction of them the autocrat is willing
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to co-opt.
The most striking example of a decentralized religion combined with
political autocracy is Islam. The difference in organizational form between
Catholicism and Islam has deep historical roots: unlike the first Christians
who built up a church structure to defend themselves against a state which
oppressed them, the Muslims had no need to construct a centralized reli-
gious organisation because Muhammad, the founder of the religion, held
political power as governor of Medina (Greif, 2006: 206; see also Lal, 1998:
62-64; Lewis, 2002: 113-15; Kepel, 2005: 237; Lilla, 2007: 56-8, 318).1
In Muslim countries, there is no hierarchy that exerts authority over the
whole clerical profession. No church establishment exists and, as a result,
the clerics operate in a rather decentralised way, pronouncing their own fat-
was (juridical rulings or opinions based on the Islamic Law) as they deem
fit. A fatwa issued by one cleric can therefore be followed by counter-fatwas
issued by other clerics. Moreover, the impact of a fatwa depends mainly
on the prestige of the cleric or the group of clerics who issue it, whether
they occupy an official position or are self-appointed (Coulson, 1964: 78-9;
Berkey, 2010: 40; Daftary, 2010; Beloucif, 2003; Filiu, 2008).
One important reason why conservative or radical clerics may not like
the autocrat’s policies or actions lies in progressive reforms that violate, or
are believed to violate, basic tenets of the faith. Think of reforms that liber-
alize divorce, allow gender mixing or reduce women’s dependence upon male
relatives or the husband, of reforms that replace traditional religious courts
by secular courts, of reforms that promote modern curricula at schools and
place the whole system of religious education under the control of the state,
or of reforms that enlarge the scope of individual liberties.2 In the Mus-
1Inside Christianity, Protestantism is quite decentralized compared to Catholicism
and Eastern Orthodoxy, especially the strand of Protestantism encountered in the United
States. It is noteworthy, however, that this strand tends to predominate in advanced
democratic countries, which are beyond the scope of our study.
2Another important reason is that the autocrat and his close circle may have indulged
in corruption and all sorts of illegal enrichment practices, while simultaneously evincing
cynical aloofness from ordinary people living in precarious conditions. In this case
religious dissenters are socially-minded clerics sensitive to the ideals of social justice and
equality inherent in monotheist religions. In this paper, for the sake of clarity we will
not elaborate on this second source of religious opposition. However, it must be stressed
that our theory can be reinterpreted in term of the anti-corruption religious motivation.
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lim world, at least some of these legal and administrative reforms have
been undertaken in countries such as Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Indone-
sia, Morocco, and Tunisia. By contrast, Algeria, Sudan, Pakistan, and
Saudi Arabia eschewed them.
In our theory, when considering the possibility of introducing progres-
sive reforms, a reformist autocrat is confronted with a trade-off between
the extent of these reforms and political stability. More precisely, forsaking
reforms allows him to enlist more clerics in his support and thereby enhance
the stability of his regime. Conversely, pushing forward with reforms may
cost him the support of a fraction of the clerics with the attendant conse-
quence of a reduced political stability. The trade-off is most evident in the
case of decentralized religions. The most uncompromising clerics are those
who require the highest price to be co-opted, hence the attention to the
marginal cleric. In contrast, stability is easier to come by with a centralized
religion since the autocrat negotiates directly with the head of the church.
The centralized structure offers a solution to the collective action problem
of the clerical body and, hence, the emphasis is on the average cleric, as the
church needs enough resources to compensate its members for the reforms.
The trade-off also underpins any comparison of the achievements of autoc-
racy under centralized and decentralized religions. A question of particular
interest is how an autocracy under a centralized religion compares with an
autocracy under a decentralized religion with respect to political stability
and engagement in reforms.
The paper shows that the presence of a decentralized body of clerics
makes autocratic regimes more unstable. It also shows that in time of sta-
bility, the level of reforms is higher with a centralized religion than with a
decentralized one. The intuition for this result is that while in the former
case the autocrat needs to buy the average cleric into submission, in the
latter case it is the most radical cleric whom he must bribe in order to
achieve the desired level of political stability. The result can be neverthe-
less upset if the autocrat chooses reforms over stability in the decentralized
case. Equilibria indeed exist where the level of reforms is higher under a
decentralized religion than under a centralized one. The regime under re-
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ligious decentralization is then reformist and unstable whereas it is stable
but more conservative under religious centralization. In the former situa-
tion, the autocrat chooses to co-opt a smaller fraction of clerics, the most
progressive ones, so that he can undertake enough reforms. In the latter,
this is not an option and, if the church is conservative (i.e., the average
cleric is conservative), the path of reforms will be slow. Comparative-static
analysis shows that, in the decentralized case, when the clerics become more
radical, the optimal policy of the autocrat is to forego progressive reforms
in order to enlist a larger clerical support and mitigate the risk of regime
collapse. By contrast, in response to a change that increases the return to
reforms, he might optimally choose to push reforms at the risk of a higher
political instability. The last part of the paper contains a good amount of
empirical evidence, but rather than constituting a rigorous empirical test
of the theory, which in any case would be extremely hard to come by, it
provides rich case study material aimed at motivating the analysis.
The paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature. Section 3 is the central part of the paper where our theory
is expounded and its results are derived. Section 4 presents illustrative
evidence by the way of historical case studies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our theory is comprised of three components: (1) there is an autocrat who
maximizes his expected surplus in conditions of uncertainty caused by the
risk of political rebellion; (2) in order to mitigate that risk, the autocrat
resorts to co-option of potential leaders of a rebellion; and (3) the leaders
to be tamed are religious clerics.
The point of departure given by (1) echoes a long tradition initiated by
Gordon Tullock (1987), who claimed that dictators primarily seek to re-
main in office, and often face a high risk of being overthrown. It is therefore
natural that many political scientists and political economists have subse-
quently examined the strategies which rulers use to stay in office, ranging
from loyalty and repression (Wintrobe, 1998), to divide-and-rule strategies
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(e.g., Verdier et al., 2004; De Luca et al., 2014), power-sharing and bargain-
ing (e.g., Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Morelli and Rohner, 2014), and even
optimal succession rules (Konrad and Skaperdas, 2007; 2015). The two
classical instruments of authoritarian control are repression and co-option,
and a few authors have explicitly studied the trade-off between these two
strategies. Among them are Desai et al. (2009) who have labeled such a
trade-off ”the authoritarian bargain”, or Bove and Rivera (2015) who ana-
lyze it as a balancing act between vertical repression of the population and
horizontal repression of the elites (see also Koga, 2015). These elites, whom
De Mesquita et al. (2005) call the ”selectorate”, are generally considered
as the most serious threat to the dictators’ power.
One common motive of the elites for deposing a dictator is the hope of
occupying power themselves (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Konrad and Skaperdas,
2007, 2015), or of obtaining more favours under another dictator (Sekeris,
2011). Evidence shows that elites tend, indeed, to control the fates of
dictators, and statistically most dictators were overthrown by members
of their inner circle rather than as a result of genuine popular uprisings.
By one estimate (iSvolik, 2009), out of 303 authoritarian rulers, 205 (68
percent) were deposed by a coup between 1945 and 2002.
The third ingredient of our theory, as reported under (3), is the reli-
gious nature of the elites considered as a target for favours by the autocrat.
Religious clerics have two special features that distinguish them from other
elites: first, they hold values regarding social justice and human rights, or
regarding proper behavior as prescribed by their religion; second, as repre-
sentatives of the supernatural world and as wise men supposedly possessing
deep knowledge (theological and philosophical, in particular), they have a
natural prestige and exert great influence on the population. Because of
these two traits, the clerics are susceptible of playing a role as political
actors. They are also susceptible of being bought off by the autocrat, and
the price to be paid will typically increase with the distance between the
values they hold and the autocrat’s policies or practices. Since there is
a continuum of values that differentiate the clerics, with a decentralized
religion the autocrat will choose the mass of religious clerics that he wants
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to co-opt. Those who are excluded form this category (i.e., non-official or
self-appointed clerics who stand beyond the autocrat’s control) represent
a threat to the regime’s stability. This is because they are able to express
socio-economic and cultural grievances ”in the only way familiar to most
people, a religious idiom arraying the forces of good against the forces of evil
and promising to bring justice to the oppressed” (Keddie, 2003: 3). In the
centralized case, on the contrary, the autocrat bargains directly with the
hierarchy of the religious institution as represented by a pope, a patriarch
or a governing council.
There is ample evidence to the effect that, in its relationship to the
sovereign, the religious officialdom (the co-opted clerics) tends to sacrifice
ethical values to the altar of personal interests. In the Ottoman empire,
for example, ”the entire religious establishment held office at the pleasure
of the sultan” (Cleveland, 2004: 48). The ”cozy relationship” between the
religious clerics (meaning not only the ulama but also the Sufi orders) and
the sultan ”translated into significant economic and political privileges” for
the former (Malik, 2012: 8). Offices typically involved lucrative functions
which included revenue generation and the administration of religious en-
dowments that controlled vast tracts of land. Religious appointments were
highly coveted as the associated incomes were exempt from taxes. Reli-
gious families possessing long-standing honourable ancestries, in particu-
lar, competed for religious offices, titles and tax farms and, when successful,
became a core component of the Ottoman nobility and a linchpin of provin-
cial administration (Hourani, 1991: 224-25; 1993; Malik, 2012: 8; Coulson,
1964).3
3The following excerpt from the monumental work of Lapidus speaks of itself: ”The
biographies of scholars show that, with the elaboration of a bureaucratic hierarchy,
interest in careers outweighed genuine piety and learning. The influence of entrenched
families enabled them to promote their children into the higher grades of the educational
and judicial hierarchies without having reached the proper preliminary levels, while
theological students who could not find patronage were excluded. In the course of
the eighteenth century the ulama became a powerful conservative pressure group. As
servants of the state the ulama no longer represented the interests of the people, nor
protected them from the abuses of political power. No longer did they represent a
transcendental Islamic ideal opposed to worldly corruption. Their integration into the
Ottoman empire made them simply the spokesmen of Ottoman legitimacy” (Lapidus,
2002: 268).
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The same observation applies to the Mamluk state in which many ulama
served not only as religious functionaries but also as administrators and full-
edged members of the state bureaucracy. In particular, the qadis (Islamic
judges) were commonly employed by the Sultan in his private secretarial
service, in his private treasury, and in the military bureaus. Some even
became viziers and, in many cases, ”the post of qadi was itself the culmi-
nation of an official rather than a religious career” (Lapidus, 1984:137-8).
As figures of power and influence, they ”acted like other politicians, partic-
ipating in patronage, control of resources and factional struggles, but with
the advantage of being able to invoke religious sanction” (Zubeida, 2011:
15). Since they were thus subservient to the interests of the ruler and his
clique, ready to compromise their religious autonomy, they would always be
able to formulate legal justifications for whatever decision the ruler wished
to make, even when the political authority was in no sense properly con-
stituted (Coulson, 1964: 83; Roy,1990: 49; Hourani, 1991: 144; Lapidus,
2002: 260).
Recent examples attest to the persistence of the above mechanism.
Thus, in Egypt, the ulama belonging to the official establishment came to
Sadat’s rescue when, confronted with strong opposition, he sorely needed
a religious sanctioning of the peace treaty (and the Camp David Agree-
ment) which he had signed with Israel. This came under the form of a
fatwa, called the ”Islamic opinion” and the ”Religious legal verdict”, is-
sued by the sheikh of al-Azhar in May 1979. The justification rested on
carefully selected Quranic verses, and on the treaties which Muhammad
himself concluded with the Qurayshites and the Ghatafan tribes so as to
establish peace in Arabia (Ramadan, 1993: 169; Kepel, 2005: 51, 116;
Marsot, 2007: 163-5). Interestingly, the Religious Legal Verdict cancelled
a previous fatwa issued by al-Azhar in 1962 to the effect of forbidding peace
with Israel. The practice of issuing fatwas in support of the ruler’s policies
continued unabated under President Mubarak.4
4For example, sheikh Sayyed Tantawy cited a passage of the Quran as support for
his opinion that those convicted of libel should be sentenced to 80 lashes. This occurred
after several journalists had been tried and convicted of publishing false information
about members of the ruling National Democratic Party and the president in 2007.
Another striking example is a fatwa issued during the same year by the grand mufti, Ali
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Submission of official clerics to autocratic rulers is not a specific feature
of Islam: in Catholic Christianity, too, priests were discouraged from ex-
pressing dissent against even tyrannical governments. It is St. Augustine
who established the key principle in this matter. According to him, despite
all its imperfections and the ”sinful” behaviour of those who govern it, the
”earthly city” exists for the sake of protecting the ”city of God”, and its role
is therefore vital for people’s salvation. To oppose worldly rulers amounts
to opposing God’s plan and Roman Catholic believers should avoid at-
tempting to overthrow governments even if they turn out to be tyrannical
(O’Daly, 2004).5
The same characterization applies to an even greater extent to East-
ern Christianity. In Russia, for example, the Orthodox Church has almost
always performed the role of a subordinate partner under autocratic au-
thority. In the words of Obolonsky (2003: 109): ”All the traditions and
customs of the official church, at least since the beginning of the seventeenth
century, worked not for its spiritual independence but, on the contrary, in
favor of complete submission of the church to the needs of the state”. This
attitude of submissiveness to temporal power is becoming again glaringly
evident under post-communism, under President Putin in particular.6
To our knowledge, our paper represents the first effort to model re-
ligious co-option under autocracy allowing for different types of religious
organisation. It also contributes to fill up a gap in research that has been
identified in a recent survey of the economics of religion (Iyer, 2016: 432;
see also Aldashev and Platteau, 2013): there is a dearth of research in
the whole field of religion, political processes, and their interaction with
Gomaa. It provided that a driver who runs over and kills someone deliberately standing
in the path of the vehicle is not to blame. This judgement happened a few days after a
woman was killed by a minibus under the control of the police as she tried to stop them
from arresting her sister-in-law (Daily News, Cairo, December 29-30, 2007).
5This belief in the God-given authority of monarchs was central to the Roman
Catholic vision of governance in the Middle Ages, Renaissance and the Ancien Regime.
Thus, for example, the kings and emperors of medieval Christendom had always invoked
divine blessing on their rule, and by the 14th and 15th centuries the parish clergy was
called to disseminate news of military victories and lead prayers requiring God’s help
for further success (Gunn, 2001: 124).
6Thus, in October 2015, the highest authority of the Russian Orthodox Church de-
clared the military intervention in Syria decided by Putin to be ”a holy war”.
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economic processes. Because of our central concern with co-option, other
dimensions of autocratic power, such as the use of coercion and military or
police repression, are left out of the model to which we now turn.
3 The model
We consider an economy with an autocrat and a clerical body. This body
is composed of a continuum of individuals with different levels of convic-
tion and commitment to the faith. We assume that each member of the
clerical class is characterized by a parameter θ ∈ [0, 1], which is distributed
according to the continuous density f(θ) and cumulative distribution F (θ)
functions. The mean value of θ is Eθ. We compare two types of religions:
centralized and decentralized.
3.1 Decentralized religion
In the decentralized religion each cleric has to choose whether to sup-
port the autocrat, and hence compromise himself with the current political
power, or to stay in the religious/spiritual sphere with no involvement in
politics. In the latter case the change of utility of the cleric is 0 (the status
quo utility). If he chooses to support the autocrat, the utility of the cleric
depends on his type θ ∈ [0, 1], on the probability that the autocrat stays in
power, p ≥ 0, on the monetary transfer or compensation which he obtains
from the autocrat, w ≥ 0, and on the extent of reforms implemented by
the same, α ≥ 0. That is,
U(θ, w, α, p) = pw − θV (α) (1)
where V (0) = 0 and V ′(α) > 0 and V ′′(α) ≥ 0.
The situation we have in mind is that of a reformist autocrat who tries to
seduce a traditionalist cleric. Term α represents the degree of progressive
(legal/economic/social) reforms implemented by the ruler, in particular,
the introduction of modern law codes dealing with administrative, criminal,
commercial, or personal status matters, the establishment of a modern
judiciary system with wide-ranging competencies, including on subjects
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traditionally covered by religious courts.7 The autocrat sets an uniform
wage or benefit, w, for all the clerics. We assume, indeed, that it would
be prohibitively costly for him to ”fine tune” compensations to the clerics
since he knows only the distribution of the clerics according to θ, not how
different values of that idiosyncratic parameter are attached to particular
clerics. Religious leaders generally stand for traditional values and order
from which they derive power, prestige and a sense of mission. If the cleric
is very traditionalist, he will severely suffer (i.e., in term of reputation,
prestige, authority, ideology) by supporting the autocrat’s reforms, while if
he is moderate, such support will be much less costly. In the model, a low
value of θ signals an individual who is a moderate, while a large θ signals
someone who is a zealot or a fundamentalist.
Another important point is that the benefit of supporting the current
political regime depends on the autocrat staying in power, while the loss
is incurred by the mere action of supporting the regime. The moral stain
of having compromised with the autocrat will stick, even if the latter is
overthrown. By contrast, the benefit w can be reaped hold only if reforms
continue to be implemented, that is, if the autocrat stays in power. So the
probability, p, that the autocrat stays in power is pivotal to the clerics’
decision to support him or not.
3.1.1 Stability of the autocracy with a decentralized religion
The probability that the autocrat stays in power depends on the proportion
of clerics that supports him. To be more specific, let θd ∈ [0, 1] be the
marginal cleric (i.e., the cleric who is indifferent between endorsing the
regime and not endorsing it). The probability that the autocrat stays in
7In the alternative interpretation of the model, α represents the fraction of the na-
tional wealth the autocrat extracts from the economy. Religious leaders find it more
difficult to support the autocrat when he is more greedy, especially if they are highly
sensitive to social injustice or strongly averse to inequality and corruption (that is, if
they have a high θ). In both cases, the utility of the cleric decreases with α, and the
disutility of the reforms/extraction is larger when θ, the ideological bias of the religious
leader, increases. Note that the model is also consistent with a situation where the
autocrat is an extremist and the cleric is more moderate.
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power is:
p =
∫ θd
0
f(θ)dθ = F (θd). (2)
As is evident, this expression increases with the fraction of religious leaders
that support the autocrat. An alternative interpretation is that there is
a continuum of clerics of equal mass but some clerics carry more weight
than others. In this interpretation f(θ) measures the influence that cleric θ
wields over the faithful. In the two interpretations F (θd) is the probability
that the autocrat stays.
Substituting p by its value from (2) yields in (1):
U(θ, w, α, p) = F (θd)w − θV (α). (3)
We deduce that, if an interior solution exists, θd is so that:
F (θd)
w
V (α)
= θd. (4)
Differentiating (4) yields:
∂θd
∂w
=
F (θd)
V (α)− f(θd)w ≥ 0 (5)
∂θd
∂α
=
−V ′(α)θd
V (α)− f(θd)w ≤ 0 (6)
as long as V (α) > f(θd)w. We will show later that this condition always
holds in equilibrium. Everything else being equal, increasing the monetary
transfer to the clerics raises the support to the autocrat (i.e., it increases
θd), while increasing the level of reforms has the opposite effect.
There are generally multiple equilibria to the above-defined static coor-
dination game of the clerics. First of all, there always is the Nash equilib-
rium where nobody endorses the autocrat’s policies, so that θd = 0. Next,
depending on the value of the ratio w
V (α)
, and on the shape of F (θ), there
will be, zero, one, two or several additional equilibria. The figures 1-3
represent some of the different possibilities for classical density functions.
They represent the identity function θ and the function w
V (α)
F (θ). The
intersection of the two functions represents an internal equilibrium (i.e., an
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equilibrium so that θ = w
V (α)
F (θ) ∈ [0, 1]). If at θ = 1 we have 1 < w
V (α)
,
there is another equilibrium, which is θd = 1 (i.e., corner solution).
The multiplicity of pure Nash equilibria in the static coordination game
implies a selection issue. Which one is going to be played? This question
lies at the core of the literature on evolutionary game theory and social
learning, the aim of which is to study equilibrium selection in games that
have multiple equilibria.8 Here the agent needs to decide whether to join the
network of the autocrat’s supporters or not, his utility depending on how
many clerical members make the same decision. This problem is similar
to the problem of social norm abidance or adoption of standards in the
presence of network externalities.9 Adding some dynamic/noise into such
coordination game helps with the selection issue. Auriol and Benaim (2000)
show that only the stable equilibria of the Ordinary Differential Equation
(ODE), dθ
d
dt
= F (θd)w − θdV (α), can be an equilibrium of this type of
coordination game. We deduce the following definition.10
Definition 1 An equilibrium θd ∈ [0, 1] of the static coordination game is
stable if and only if f(θd)w − V (α) < 0.
In what follows, we focus on the stable equilibria of the coordination
game. As it will become clear when we solve the autocrat’s optimization
problem, this is done without loss of generality: only stable equilibria are
compatible with the autocrat having a positive payoff and the condition for
stability is identical to the condition under which θd varies positively with
w and negatively with α. The shape of the density function is crucial in
determining which equilibrium is stable. Figures 1-3 represent the function
F (θ) w
V (α)
, which varies between 0 when θ = 0 and w
V (α)
when θ = 1. The
shape of this function depends on the shape of the cumulative distribution
8See Weibull (1996) for a primer on evolutionary game theory.
9In this literature the utility of an agent when she chooses to join a network or adopt
a standard depends on the fraction/number of other agents who make the same decision.
For a survey on standardization in presence of network externalities, see Park (2006),
and for the social norm approach, see Platteau, Auriol, and Camilotti, 2017.
10Let dxdt = g(x) be an autonomous differential equation. Suppose x(t) = x
∗ is an
equilibrium, i.e., g(x∗) = 0. Then if g′(x∗) < 0, the equilibrium x(t) = x∗ is stable, and
if g′(x∗) > 0, the equilibrium x(t) = x∗ is unstable. For more on selection of equilibria
in dynamic coordination games, see Auriol and Benaim (2000, 2001).
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function F (θ). The intersection between the bisectrix and the function
corresponds to the marginal cleric according to (4) (i.e., a cleric who is
indifferent between supporting the autocrat or not supporting him). The
clerics of type θ so that F (θ) w
V (α)
is greater than the bisectrix are those who
support the autocrat. And, symmetrically, the clerics for whom F (θ) w
V (α)
is below the bisectrix do not support him.
Figure 1 illustrates a case where the density function f(θ) is U-shaped
(i.e., convex), which implies that F (θ) is first concave and next convex.
It represents a distribution of clerics which tends to put more weight at
the extremes. If we think of Islam, at the lower extreme are located the
representatives of ’high Islam’ who typically come from well-to-do family
dynasties and are well connected to power circles. At the higher extreme
are clerics from the ’low Islam’ who are typically residing in rural areas
or poor urban neighbourhoods, and belong to mystical fraternities such as
Sufi orders.11 With such an heterogeneous, polarized clerical group, the
internal equilibrium, when it exists, is stable: a fraction F (θd) (the high
Islam) supports the autocrat, while a fraction 1 − F (θd) (the low Islam)
does not. Any random perturbation around the equilibrium (say, caused
by the death of some cleric, who is then replaced by a new draw from f(θ))
will bring back the system to the internal equilibrium. This is intuitive
when the clerics are thus polarized (see the quotation from Lapidus, 2002,
in Section 2; see also Platteau, 2015: Chap. 5).
Figure 2 illustrates a case where the density function f(θ) is single-
peaked with the peak at 0. It represents a distribution of clerics where
the majority is close to the autocrat. As will become clearer in the empir-
ical part, this case aptly describes the state-religion relationships as they
obtained in Iran under the Safavids. Then, indeed, the rulers managed
to create a fairly supportive clerical body which had the appearance of a
11According to Nielsen (2012), Muslim clerics tend to avoid extremist positions if their
career prospects are good. However, those who have relatively few connections with the
religious establishment and do not have access to prestigious training or prominent
teachers may be tempted to make careers outside of the state system by appealing to
lay audiences directly. These clerics can credibly signal independence from state elites
by openly espousing Jihadi ideology, making it a risky but potentially high-payoff way
to advance their clerical careers.
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national church although, as will become clear later, Shi’ism cannot be re-
garded as a centralized brand of Islam. The Iranian form of Shi’ite Islam is
the closest to centralization that we can find in the whole Islamic world, as
the Safavids’ rulers were able to create a favorable distribution of clerics.
In this case, the internal equilibrium is stable and the process to reach it
is smooth: the autocrat can easily enroll the fraction of the clerics that he
wants by fine-tuning the favours distributed to them.
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates a case where the density function f(θ) is
single-peaked with the peak at 1. The peak corresponds to an antagonistic
cleric who is opposed to the autocratic ruler. In this case, the internal
equilibrium, when it exists, is unstable. The two stable equilibria are either
nobody supports the autocrat, or everybody supports him. This implies
that if he starts from scratch, it is very hard for the autocrat to get the
support of the clerics. In particular, small efforts will inevitably fail and the
system will go back to zero support from the clerics. A big initial push will
be required to make the jump from the zero support equilibrium to a large
support one. The situation that this last case depicts is one in which there
is a strong opposition to the autocrat from the clerical body, such as could
be observed in Iran after the collapse of the Safavid regime, particularly
under the Qajar dynasty. A radical change had indeed occurred in the
distribution of the clerics during the chaotic period between the Safafid
and the Qajar regimes, as the previously co-opted clerics were obliged to
fled the country.
3.1.2 The autocrat’s optimal policy with a decentralized religion
The autocrat, who is self-interested, needs to set α ≥ 0 and w ≥ 0. He
maximizes his expected payoff. If he seizes and keeps power, which occurs
with probability F (θd), he gets the gross benefit G(α), which is the rent
accruing to him if the level of reform, α, is implemented. The idea is that
reforms are of a type that accelerates economic growth while enabling the
ruler to appropriate the share G(α) of the dividends. Moreover, the growth
impact of the reforms diminishes as more of them are adopted or a given
reform is more intensively applied. Formally we assume that G(α) is a
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strictly increasing and concave function of α: G(0) = 0, G′(α) > 0 and
G′′(α) ≤ 0. The slope of G(α) varies depending upon the characteristics
of the country’s technological environment. For example, the autocrat’s
rent is less sensitive to reforms if he rules over a resource rich territory.
However, the autocrat has to share his rent G(α) with his followers: he
must pay w to the fraction F (θd) of clerics that supports him.
The timing of the co-option game with a decentralized clerical body is
the following.
1. The autocrat announces α and w.
2. A fraction θd ∈ [0, 1] of the clerics chooses to support the autocrat
where θd is a stable equilibrium of the coordination game.
3. The autocrat implements reform α.
4. The autocrat is overthrown with probability 1−F (θd), in which case
he does not get G(α) and the supportive clerics do not get w. If the
autocrat stays in power, he get G(α) and the supportive clerics get
w.
If he is not able to climb to power, the autocrat gets his status quo utility
normalized to 0. If he is overthrown, he also gets 0 as he loses everything
he acquired while in power. Being self-interested, he focuses exclusively on
his own payoff which is related to his ability to stay in power. In other
words, he does not care about what happens to the rest of the economy if
he is removed. The objective function of the autocrat is therefore:
Up(θd, w, α) = F (θd)(G(α)− w), (7)
There are three possibilities.
If the autocrat chooses the corner solution θd = 0, his utility is 0. If
he chooses the corner solution 1, the autocrat solves: maxG(α) − w so
that w
V (α)
≥ a ≥ 1, where a is the minimum value so that the corner
solution holds. He then chooses the minimum value of w compatible with
the constraint: w = aV (α). The optimal solution, then, is α∗a so that
G′(α)
V ′(α) = a ≥ 1. The minimum value ensuring that the corner solution
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holds, a, depends on the resolution of the stable interior solution case (see
the examples below). Note that the above implies that
w =
V (α)
V ′(α)
G′(α). (8)
Let us now look at interior solutions.
Let θd ∈ (0, 1) be such that F (θd) w
V (α)
= θd. The autocrat solves:
max
w,α
Up(w, α) = F (θd)(G(α)− w), (9)
s.t. F (θd) w
V (α)
= θd
Equivalently, after replacing w by its value from the constraint, w =
θdV (α)
F (θd)
, we optimize the objective function with respect to (θ, α). The au-
tocrat’s optimization problem becomes for θ ∈ [0, 1]:
max
θ,α
Up(θ, α) = F (θ)G(α)− θV (α) (10)
Optimizing (10) with respect to θ and α yields the first-order conditions:
∂Up
∂θ
= f(θ)G(α)− V (α) = 0 (11)
∂Up
∂α
= F (θ)G′(α)− θV ′(α) = 0 (12)
From (11), we deduce that at the optimum
V (α) = f(θd)G(α). (13)
The condition V (α) > f(θd)w, which is necessary for conditions (5) and
(6) to hold and for the equilibrium to be stable (see definition 1), is thus
equivalent to G(α) > w: this is a necessary condition for the autocrat to
obtain a positive payoff. In other words, when the autocrat is willing to
participate to the co-option game (i.e., when he makes a positive payoff),
it is necessarily true that dθ
d
dw
≥ 0 and dθd
dα
≤ 0, and that the equilibrium is
stable. On the other hand, equation (12) implies that F (θ
d)
θd
= V
′(α)
G′(α) , while
(4) implies that F (θ
d)
θd
= V (α)
w
. Both equations yield w = G′(α)V (α)/V ′(α).
We can now deduce the result stated in Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 The autocrat who wants to implement a level α > 0 of
reforms offers to decentralized clerics a wage equal to:
wd =
V (α)
V ′(α)
G′(α). (14)
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
Proposition 1 holds whether the autocrat chooses the corner solution
(θd = 1) or the interior one (θd < 1). At this stage, it is useful to con-
duct some comparative-static analysis. First, starting from the interior
equilibrium, if the autocrat wants to increase the level of reforms, he will
necessarily lose the support of some clerics: dθ
d
dα
≤ 0 (for the proof see
appendix 6.2). This is an intuitive result.
Second, it seems also intuitive that an autocrat who wants to implement
more reforms will wish to raise the level of compensation offered to the
clerics. This is not necessarily the case, however. To see this point, we
differentiate w with respect to α in (14). This yields:
dwd
dα
=
(V ′(α))2 − V ′′(α)V (α)
(V ′(α))2
G′(α) +
G′′(α)V (α)
V ′(α)
. (15)
Since G(α) is increasing and concave, a necessary (but not sufficient) condi-
tion for the wage of the clerics to increase when the level of reform is raised
is that the first term is strictly positive, which requires V (α) to be log-
concave. For instance, log-concavity holds if V (α) = W α
v
v
, with W > 0 and
0 < 1 ≤ v. By contrast, if V (α) is log-convex (e.g., V (α) = exp(α2) − 1),
the wage of the clerics necessarily decreases with the level of reforms, which
is rather counter-intuitive.
There is another way to see this counter-intuitive result. To interpret
equation (14) in economic terms, let us rewrite it as:
wd
G(α)
=
G,α
V,α
, (16)
where G,α denotes the elasticity to reforms of the autocrat’s payoff, and
V,α the elasticity to reforms of the clerics’ disutility. Both elasticities are
positive. The autocrat can increase stability either by decreasing the pace
of reform, α, or by increasing the bribe to the clerics, wd. Equation (16)
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shows that the optimal combination between reform and bribe is such that
the ratio of the bribe to the autocrat’s payoff (i.e., the share of the windfalls
of the reform that is awarded to the supportive clerics) is equal to the ratio
of the reform-elasticity of the autocrat’s payoff to the reform-elasticity of
the clerics’ disutility. This equation is a reminiscence of the Dorfman-
Steiner (1954) condition which, in the industrial organization literature,
describes the optimal advertising/sale ratio. Here, what we derive is the
optimal bribe/payoff ratio. The implication in our context is therefore
the following: the higher the sensitivity of the autocrat’s payoff G(α) to
the reform effort, or the lower the sensitivity of the clerics’ disutility to the
same, the higher the share of the reform gain that will accrue to the clerics.
In these conditions, the autocrat is willing to push forward with reforms
and, therefore, to better compensate clerics so as not to lose too much of
their support. Since the sensitivity of the disutility to the reforms tends
to be higher with log-convex functions than with log-concave ones, this
explains that the clerics’ compensation decreases when reforms increase
and their disutility is log-convex.
The analysis of this section is quite general and it is not clear which
solution, corner or interior, will dominate in practice. We prove below
that both solutions can be optimal depending on the cost and benefit of
the reforms and on the distribution of the clerics. To make this point, it
is sufficient to consider an example. We assume that G(α) = K α
g
g
, and
V (α) = W α
v
v
, with K,W > 0 and v > 1 > g > 0. We moreover focus on
two types of distribution, which are particularly relevant to our historical
examples.
The first type is obtained when the density function, f(θ), is U-shaped,
so that F (θ) is first concave and then convex. It corresponds to the afore-
mentioned distinction between high and low Islams.
The second example corresponds to a case of convergence of values and
purpose between political power and religion, as it occurred in Safavid Iran
(see section 4.2.2). It is represented formally by a decreasing density func-
tion (i.e., the preference of the clerical members are close to the preference
of the autocrat). In this case, F (θ) is concave.
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Proposition 2 Assume that G(α) = K α
g
g
, and V (α) = W α
v
v
, with v >
1 > g > 0 and K,W > 0. Assume the density function f(θ) is either
decreasing or symmetrical U-shaped on [0, 1]. Then, there exists a threshold
value νf > 0 so that the autocrat chooses the interior equilibrium if and only
if v < (1 + νf )g.
Proof. See the appendix 6.3.
In the above examples, when v is much larger than g, the autocrat
prefers stability to reforms (he picks the corner equilibrium), while when
the difference between v and g is small, he prefers reforms over stability (he
picks the interior equilibrium). This implies that an increase in the return
of the reforms, for instance an increase in g resulting from technological
progress, will tend to cause more political instability.12 Symmetrically, a
radicalization of the clerics in the form of an increase in v (i.e., an increase
of the marginal cost imposed on them by the reforms) will tend to lead to
more inertia and cause a sharp decrease in reforms: the autocrat adopts
conservative policies and stability increases. This result means that the
autocrat never chooses to make up for a higher cost or a smaller benefit of
reforms by raising the material privileges of the clerics to such an extent
that more reforms are adopted. In fact, he may even choose to decrease
these privileges at the new equilibrium to partly offset his reduction in
rent. Finally, the transition between the stable and the reformist equilib-
rium is never smooth: at the threshold, a marginal increase in g implies
a jump from the full support equilibrium to the interior equilibrium, and
symmetrically for a marginal increase in v (i.e., a jump from a reformist
equilibrium to a conservative one).
Another relevant example for our empirical investigation is when the
clerics’ preference tends to be far from the preference of the autocrat,
thereby creating a lot of tension between secular and religious powers. In
this case, F (θ) is convex (as in Figure 3). If w
V (α)
≤ 1, the only stable
equilibrium is 0. If w
V (α)
> 1, there are two stable equilibria 0 and 1, and
12For instance, with the U-shaped density f(θ) = 2− 6θ + 6θ2, an increase in g from
0.5v to 0.9v implies that the autocrat will push more reforms and will loose half of the
clerical support in the process (see Appendix 6.3.1).
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an unstable interior equilibrium. As pointed out earlier, if the autocrat
starts with a very low base of supporters, he will never be able to get the
support of the clerics. This is a situation where he needs a big push to
move from equilibrium 0 to equilibrium 1. The maximum amount the au-
tocrat is willing to pay to make the jump to full clerical support is his total
rent: w = G(α). If he wants to maximize the support from the centralized
clerical body, he will have to maximize w − V (α) = G(α) − V (α). From
there, we easily deduce the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume the distribution of the clerics, f(θ) is strictly in-
creasing. The autocrat chooses α∗ so that G
′(α)
V ′(α) = 1 and w
∗ = G(α∗).
In other words, an autocrat who is confronted with a powerful antago-
nistic clerical body will simply surrender its power to it. He will implement
the reforms and monetary transfers that maximize the welfare of the most
radical cleric in whose hands real power rests.
We now turn to the study of a centralized religion.
3.2 Centralized religion
In centralized religions, such as Catholicism and Eastern Christianity, a
chain of command prevails. The clerics belong to a ”church” and must
obey their hierarchy. In the Russian orthodox Church, for example, ’aloof-
ness’, which denotes an attitude of distance from the Church’s authority,
was considered to be a severe sin during the 17-19th centuries and even
more so during the reigns of the last two Romanovs (Alexander III and
Nicolas II): only submission to religious authority was acceptable, and this
applied not only to the priests but also to the parishioners who were dis-
suaded from reading the Bible (Obolonsky, 2003: 109). Conceived as a
manifestation of God’s immutable presence in man’s history, a church’s
perceived interest is to preserve its integrity and monopoly. Hence the ex-
tremely restrictive conditions under which a cleric can be excommunicated
and the great effort expended by the church’s leadership to achieve internal
cohesion and discipline.
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We denote the cleric who is at the head of the church by θc ∈ [0, 1]. He
is the one to decide whether the Church supports the autocrat or not. If
the leader chooses to support the autocrat, he will also have to compensate
the clerics who belong to the Church and dislike the reforms implemented.
This is to ensure that in equilibrium they all get a positive utility. Such fine
tuning of compensation is possible because each member of the religious or-
ganization is scrutinized and trained by the church hierarchy before he/she
is allowed to join. For instance, Catholic priests go through a lengthy ini-
tiation process before their ordination.13 During this process, they live in
closed communities and learn a great deal about each other. They are also
obliged to confess their sins and controversial thoughts on a regular basis.
In this type of organization, which stresses the importance of obedience
and rely on confession, members cannot easily conceal their preferences
and values. Possessing such a knowledge, the head of the church is in a
position to design a transfer scheme such that the church’s members behave
in a consistent way and fully support the autocrat, if this is the decision
made by the hierarchy. In other words, the centralized structure helps the
members of the clerical body to overcome their collective action problem.14
What the above implies is that, with a centralized church, the autocrat
will have to give away in rents a minimum of w = EθV (α). This minimum
ensures that all the church members can be compensated for the disutility
of the reforms, but it does not guarantee that the head of the church will be
willing to himself support the autocrat. As a matter of fact, the head of the
church and the autocrat bargain over the rents generated by the reforms,
and they are both selfish. We focus on the Nash bargaining solution. The
bargaining power of the church’s leader, denoted by bc ∈ [0, 1], is assumed
to be exogenously given. The power of the autocrat is 1 − bc ∈ [0, 1]. In
case of disagreement, the autocrat and the church’s head get their status
quo utility: their disagreement point is 0. The problem to be solved is,
13For instance in the US it usually takes four years after college or eight years after
high school to become a diocesan priest. In seminary the future priests study philosophy,
Latin, Greek, Gregorian chants, dogmatic and moral theology, exegesis, canon law, and
church history.
14We are grateful to Joan Esteban and Jean-Marie Baland for helping us to clarify
this important point.
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therefore, the following:15
max
w,α
(
G(α)− w
)1−bc(
w − θcV (α)
)bc
(17)
s.t. w ≥ EθV (α)
Solving this problem, we are able to establish the following result.
Proposition 4 Let θc ∈ [0, 1] be the ideological type of the centralized reli-
gion leadership. The level of reforms, αc, and the monetary transfers, wc,
received by the religious organisation are
1. αc so that G′(α) = θcV ′(α) and wc = (1 − bc)θcV (αc) + bcG(αc) if
Eθ < bc
G(αc)
V (αc)
+ (1− bc)G′(αc)V ′(αc)
2. αc so that bc
G(α)
V (α)
+ (1− bc)G′(α)V ′(α) = Eθ and wc = EθV (αc) otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix 6.4.
Condition 1 holds when θc is relatively large (i.e., when the head of
the church is hostile to the autocrat). In this case (Case 1), the autocrat
has to abandon large rents to the church in order to win its support. The
monetary transfer is large so that the individual rationality constraint of
the members of the church is easily met (i.e., wc > EθV (αc) so that the
constraint is not binding). Condition 2 holds when the head of the church is
close to the autocrat so that θc is small. In this case (Case 2), the problem
of the autocrat is to transfer enough resources to the church to be able to
buy the support of all the clerical members (i.e., the individual rationality
constraint of the clerical body is binding).
To get closed form solution, we illustrate the result of Proposition 4
with the help of an example. If we consider the case of G(α) = K α
g
g
, and
V (α) = W α
v
v
, with v > 1 > g > 0 and K,W > 0 then
15The bargaining model presented by Nash (1950) can be formulated as a Nash Bar-
gaining Product (see Binmore et al., 1986). In our simple bargaining problem, the
disagreement payoffs are the outside options of the parties. However, there are many
other relevant economic situations where the disagreement game is richer. For an analy-
sis of how endogenously determined threat points in the disagreement game impact the
equilibrium, see Esteban and Sakovics (2008).
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1. αc =
(
K
W
1
θc
) 1
v−g
if Eθ <
(
1 + bc
v − g
g
)
θc
2. αc =
(
K
W
1 + bc
v−g
g
Eθ
) 1
v−g
otherwise
From a static comparative point of view, it is straightforward to check
that the level of reforms, αc, decreases with θc and with Eθ (see Proposition
4 and the example above). In Case 1, αc decreases with θc. In Case 2, αc
decreases with Eθ. The transition between the two cases depends on θc,
which has to be small enough relative to Eθ. Since the level of reforms
is higher in Case 2 than in Case 1, it implies that, everything else being
equal, the autocrat would like to control the nomination process of the
head of the church. To be able to do so (i.e, to move from Case 1 to Case
2), the autocrat is willing to pay up to the difference of its rents. If he can
choose, the autocrat would like to pick a religious leader who is not too
antagonistic to his ruling (i.e., whose θc is sufficiently small so that Case 2
holds). in reality, however, this does not mean that he would like to pick
someone too close to him (say, a person from his inner circle). Indeed,
such a nomination might weaken the credibility of the religious leader and
hence his ability to legitimize the autocrat in the name of the whole clerical
community.16
Historically, Case 1 corresponds to the medieval struggle between secu-
lar and religious powers as illustrated by the Investiture Controversy (see,
for example, Bonney, 1991: Chaps 3-5; Cantor, 1993: Chaps 16-19; Arm-
strong, 2014: Chaps 8-12).17 The stake was high since the pope claimed
the right to interfere in the politics of Catholic countries and to depose
sovereigns not to his liking.The struggle came to a climax in the 14th cen-
tury with the rise of nationalism and the increased prominence of lawyers,
both royalist and canon. Great controversies ensued and the papacy finally
16We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this fact.
17On the surface, the controversy, which began about 1078 and was resolved with
the Concordat of Worms in 1122, was over a matter of official procedures regarding
the appointments to religious offices. Underneath, however, was a struggle for power
and control between the monarchies of what would later be called the ”Holy Roman
Empire”, France, and England, on the one hand, and the papacy, on the other.
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met with disaster when the Great Schism occurred. The situation of prox-
imity between the autocrat and the church, which culminated in the eras
of absolutism and the rise of modern nations and national churches, is well
captured by Case 2.18
Another interesting result of comparative static analysis reported in
Proposition 4 is related to the impact of shifts in the distribution of clerics
on the path of reforms. With a centralized religion, the level of reforms
is independent of changes in the distribution of clerics that preserve the
mean, including mean-preserving spread. This is a virtue of the centralized
structure, which is able to deal with the heterogeneity of its members by
fine tuning the compensations and incentives it provides to each of them.
With national churches (Case 2), the autocrat’s decisions are driven by the
average cleric and, with the exception of the head of the church hierarchy,
the clerics do not get rents. In the decentralized structure, by contrast,
the autocrat’s decisions are driven by the marginal cleric whom we earlier
characterized as the most radical one. In this instance, it follows that the
infra-marginal clerics obtain a rent, which is decreasing with θ. In the next
section, we study how these differences impact the path of reforms and the
political stability of the autocracy.
3.3 Comparison of centralized vs decentralized reli-
gions: reforms and stability
In this section, we would like to compare how the optimal mix of reforms
and bribes chosen by the autocrat to maximise his utility differs depending
on whether the religion is centralized or decentralized. In particular, is
one structure more conducive to reforms than the other? The next, related
issue is which structure leads to more political stability. In order to conduct
our comparisons of equilibria, we start from a situation where the only
difference between the two autocracies is the structure of their religion. In
other words, the cost and benefit of the reforms and the distribution of the
clerical body are the same in the different economies.
18In the high nobility, the eldest son would inherit the family land and the associated
title while younger siblings often found careers in the church. Many bishops and abbots
were themselves part of the ruling nobility and hence close enough to the autocrat.
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Let us first compare the stability of the two regimes. With a centralized
religion, the autocrat negotiates directly with the head of the church. He
needs to transfer enough resources not only to seduce him personally but
also to compensate the church’s members for the reforms to be undertaken.
In exchange of these rents, he gets the support of the hierarchy and the
full clerical body as well. In equilibrium, therefore, the system is fairly
stable. By contrast, under a decentralized religion, the autocrat has to
gain the support of each cleric individually. Since it is costly to enroll the
whole clerical body (i.e., the transfer must be large enough to co-opt the
most radical type), the autocrat often chooses to co-opt only a fraction
of them. In equilibrium, the fraction of religious clerics who support the
autocrat is thus generally smaller under a decentralized religion than under
a centralized one. The next proposition collects this result.
Proposition 5 Everything else being equal, centralized religions lead to
more stability than decentralized religions, as a larger fraction of clerics
support the autocrat.
A prediction of the theory is therefore that, everything else being equal,
the tenure of autocrats in Catholic countries, for example, should be on
average longer than the tenure of autocrats in Muslim countries.
We next aim to compare the level of reforms implemented by the auto-
crat in periods of political stability. Toward that purpose, we compare the
level of reforms chosen by the autocrat under a decentralized religion when
he chooses political stability with the level implemented under a centralized
religion. As analyzed in Section 3.1, cases indeed exist where the autocrat
chooses θd = 1 under a decentralized religion.19
Proposition 6 In conditions of political stability, so that F (θd) = 1, the
level of reforms with a decentralized religion, αd, is always smaller than the
level of reforms with a centralized one, αc.
θd = 1⇔ αd ≤ αc (18)
19For instance, when G(α) = K α
g
g , and V (α) = W
αv
v , with K,W > 0, g ∈ (0, 1)
and v = 2g, the autocrat will choose the equilibrium θd = 1 both with density f(θ) =
2− 6θ + 6θ2 and f(θ) = 2(θ+1)2 (see Appendix 6.3.1 and Appendix 6.3.2 respectively).
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Proof. See Appendix 6.5
It bears emphasis that Proposition 6 is quite general. It does not depend
on the specific shape of G(α) or V (α), nor F (θ). It shows that in conditions
of political stability (i.e., when all the clerics are co-opted by the autocrat
under both types of religious organization), centralized religions lead to
more reforms than decentralized ones. This result seems intuitive when
the religious authority is close to the autocrat. More surprisingly, however,
it is also true when the clerical authority is antagonistic to the monarch. As
a matter of fact, buying stability in the presence of a decentralized clerical
body is comparatively costly because the autocrat must co-opt the most
radical cleric, while under a centralized religion, he must only convince
the head of the church and transfer enough resources to buy the average
cleric. Since the compensation unambiguously increases with the level of
reforms, stability comes with a lot of reform inertia when the religion is
decentralized. The structural heterogeneity of the clerical body is then an
obstacle to reforms because, in order to gain the full support of the religious
clerics, the autocrat must adopt more conservative policies than he would
need to do if he could deal with a centralized religious authority. In the
latter circumstance, having everybody on board is cheaper and easier.
If we relax the assumption of political stability, is it still true that a
decentralized religion hampers reforms? The answer is not necessarily:
there are equilibria where, everything else being equal except the type of
religious organization, the decentralized religion yields a higher level of
reforms but at the cost of greater instability. To prove this result, it is
sufficient to find an example where it is indeed the case.
Let G(α) = K α
g
g
, and V (α) = W α
v
v
, with 2g > v ≥ 1 > g > 0 and
K,W > 0. Let f(θ) = 2
(1+θ)2
for θ ∈ [0, 1]. Let v and g to be close so
that in the decentralized case the autocrat prefers the interior equilibrium
(see the proof of Proposition 2 in the appendix 6.3 for the exact condition).
We deduce that αd =
(
K
W
2g
v
) 1
v−g . Let θc be large so that Condition 1 in
proposition 4 holds (so that political stability is costly in terms of reforms
under a centralized religion). We deduce that αc =
(
K
W
1
θc
) 1
v−g . Comparing
αd and αc, it is straightforward to check that αd > αc ⇔ θc > v
2g
. There
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is a whole range of parameter values such that this condition holds. In
other words, in some cases the autocrat operating under the decentralized
religious organization will conduct more reforms than the same autocrat
under the centralized organization. To achieve this relatively high level of
reforms, he will disregard a fraction of the clerics. This is not an option
with a centralized organization, which is inclusive by nature. If the church
is dominated by fairly conservative clerics, the reform path will be slow.
4 Empirical Evidence
Our model yields two distinct sets of interesting results: the predictions
derived from the comparison between centralized and decentralized reli-
gions, and comparative-static results obtained under religious decentraliza-
tion. The rationale behind our focus on the latter situation when deriving
comparative-static results is that trade-offs between stability and reforms
are particularly interesting in this case. To rigorously test these results
is an extremely arduous task because data requirements are quite strin-
gent and some variables, such as the level of reforms and the distribution
of clerics according to their degree of aversion to them, are not easy to
measure. The difficulty is obviously compounded by the fact that we are
dealing with historical events. In the following, we will therefore pursue the
more modest objective of using countries case study material that contains
qualitative evidence for the purpose of illustrating our results. However, to
check the impact of centralized versus decentralized religious organization,
we are lucky to have available a few recent empirical studies. We begin our
discussion with the latter.
4.1 Centralized versus decentralized religions
4.1.1 Political stability
Blaydes and Chaney (2013) show that, under conditions of autocracy, a
centralized religion (Catholicism) was historically associated with greater
political stability than a decentralized one (Islam). Studying the dura-
tions of rulers in the Christian West and Islamic Worlds from 800 to 1600,
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they find that on average the former had significantly longer tenure than
the latter, and the duration gap is widening as time elapses. Duration
for Catholic kings was the longest when they started to create national
churches and move towards absolutism. This finding is consistent with our
theory, yet the information available does not permit to establish causality
and to identify the mechanism underlying the relationship. It is revealing
that our explanation differs from that proposed by Blaydes and Chaney for
whom the reason behind the difference lies in the military sphere (merce-
nary armies in the lands of Islam versus loyal armies in the Catholic lands).
The two stories, it may be noted, can possibly complement each other.
4.1.2 Achieving reforms
The invention of the printing press, in the mid-fifteenth century, proved to
be a major technological breakthrough with dramatic institutional conse-
quences for the countries that adopted it. If adoption was relatively quick
in many European countries, opposition against it for three centuries pre-
vented the Ottoman Empire from reaping the benefits of rapid diffusion
of scientific, technical and other types of knowledge that it made possible
(Van Zanden, 2009: 178-87). For Davis Landes (1998), the refusal of the
printing press had the effect of cutting Muslims off from the mainstream
of knowledge (pp. 401-2). In a recent paper, Cosgel, Miceli and Rubin
(2012) propose an explanation of the Ottoman puzzle that is consistent
with our theory. The Ottomans regulated the printing press heavily to
prevent the loss it would have caused to the ruler’s net revenue by un-
dermining the legitimacy provided by religious authorities. Accepting the
press would have antagonised a large fraction of them because it would have
altered the technology of transmitting knowledge, providing knowledge di-
rectly from books or from literate individuals not necessarily affiliated with
Islamic clerics. Political stability and religious sanctioning of the state’s fis-
cal prerogatives were thus preserved at the cost of innovation adoption and
long-term economic growth.
Why was the situation different in Europe? The key fact here is that in
the century following the invention of the printing press, when its diffusion
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started to increase rapidly to reach an output of 200 millions towards the
end of the 16th century (Buringh and Van Zanden, 2009: 417, Table 2), the
central power of Rome was being replaced by national churches, in France
and Spain in particular, and these churches began to resist the claims of the
pope in favor of supporting their own monarchies (Kaplan, 2007). More-
over, as a result of the Reformation, Protestant churches emerged in some
European countries such as England, Sweden and the German states (Pen-
nington, 1970; Naphy, 2007). This process of power concentration in the
hands of centralized polities matched by national churches culminated in
the 17-18th centuries with the age of absolutism. National religions had
then become important vehicles of legitimacy for the rising modern states
of Europe, and the famous Augsburg principle ’cuius regio eius religio’ en-
joyed a strong revival. It meant that inhabitants who did not subscribe to
the official creed and church of their polity could not claim all the privileges
of full citizenship, and they were vulnerable to the charge of treason when
the regime was under threat (Kaplan, 2007: 110-36). Compared to me-
dieval times where the church was integral to government and religion hard
to distinguish from politics, the time had come for statesmen to clearly
distinguish the two worlds and to assert the domination of politics over
religion (Armstrong, 2014: 232-4; see also Skinner 1978, Vol. 2: 349-50;
Cavanaugh, 2009: 11). Consistent with our theory, the rise of absolutist
monarchies largely in control of centralized national religions coincided with
the initiation of important reforms, not only the promotion of the printing
press but also the ending of feudal partitioning, the emergence of profes-
sional standing armies and rationalized bureaucracies, and the codification
of state laws (Anderson, 1998).
4.1.3 The underlying mechanism
In the model, we assume that the centralized structure is able to coordinate
its members’ action to support reforms condoned by the hierarchy. This is
not possible with a decentralized religion. Blaydes and Platas Izama (2015)
bring evidence of an association between the degree of centralization of reli-
gion and the level of progressive reforms (rather than political stability) in
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Egypt today. More specifically, they seek to uncover the factors responsible
for the contrast observed between the perceptible decrease of the practice
of female genital mutilation among the Christian Copts and the rather un-
changed situation among the Muslims in spite of the fact that the practice
is forbidden by Egyptian law. The authors tentatively explain this con-
trasted evolution by the different religious authority structures prevailing
in the two communities: whereas a hierarchical order prevails among the
Copts, the Muslims are used to live in a much more decentralized organi-
zation. In other words, there exists a centralized Coptic church that exerts
a significant influence on the believers and its leaders have chosen to take
a clear stand against the cutting of girls. Muslims, on the other hand,
go to mosques that are run by different imams who hold varying opinions
about the practice. This evidence usefully highlights the advantage of a
centralized religion over a decentralized one when it comes to surmounting
collective action problems. This mechanism is at the heart of our theory of
religious co-optation, which can be seen as a formalization of Blaydes and
Platas Izama’s argument.
4.2 Illustrative examples: the case of Islam
Here, we are concerned with the effects of critical parameters of our model
on reforms and political stability in the context of decentralized religions.
These parameters are G(α), f(θ) and v, which measure the autocrat payoff
from reforms, the distribution of clerics, and their sensitivity to reforms,
respectively. All the examples are drawn from the Muslim world which sup-
plies us with many cases of strong and persisting autocracies (see Platteau,
forthcoming: Chap. 6, for a more detailed discussion). There are other de-
centralized religions than Islam, such as Judaism, American Protestantism,
Hinduism, and Budhism. However, we do not observe a combination of au-
tocracy and decentralized clerics in the case of the three former religions
whereas, for Budhism, Myanmar and Sri Lanka are pertinent country cases,
yet poorly documented in the available literature.
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4.2.1 Saudi Arabia and Kemalist Turkey
In the following, we compare the situation obtained in two countries with
strongly contrasted characteristics in term of the autocrat’s payoff function.
Saudi Arabia
The first polar case arises when the autocrat’s payoff is largely inde-
pendent of reform efforts such as in rent-based economies. There, indeed,
prosperity is almost entirely based on the exploitation of abundant and
highly priced natural resources, and the function G(α) has a weak slope.
When this is the case, a simple look at the ruler’s objective function (7)
shows that, since reform efforts are unproductive while they will cause a
loss of clerical support (for a given value of w), α will be set to zero. As
for w, it will be small because clerics are not antagonistic to a ruler when
he does not undertake reforms. In spite of the relatively low w, the en-
tire clerical class can be mobilized in support of the ruler with the direct
consequence that the probability of the ruler’s survival is one (survival is
certain). Looking back at the equation that defines the bribe-to-rent ratio
at equilibrium, since the elasticity of the autocrat’s rent with respect to
reforms is small while the elasticity of the cost of reforms for clerics is high
(in the case of Saudi Arabia discussed below), the equilibrium value of the
ratio must be low.
Saudi Arabia offers a perfect example since it is blessed with huge oil
resources and led by a clique of authoritarian rent-earners (the Saud fam-
ily) who rule over a deeply conservative society. Since the foundation of the
modern Saudi state, an important plank of the ruler’s strategy to main-
tain a loyal citizenry has consisted of co-opting the religious establishment
of Wahhabite Sunnis. The founder of the creed, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab (1703-1792), had developed a puritanical and ultra-conservative
doctrine which rejected all that could be regarded as illegitimate inno-
vations and the special devotion of the Sufi orders. It gained significant
influence only when the Saud tribe decided to espouse it as the national
ideology of their newly formed kingdom in 1932 (Hourani, 1991: 257-8; Al-
Rasheed, 1996, 2002, 2006; Nevo, 1998; Feldman, 2008: 93-4; Saint-Prot,
2008: 271-316). Wahhabism was a state ideology that delivered to the ruler
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and his clique ”undisputed authority, social mobilization and a legitimizing
discourse” (Filiu, 2015: 39).
Whenever in difficulty, the king called on the leading ulama to vindi-
cate his actions, including military ones. This illustrates another feature of
Wahhabism which, although strongly puritanical, proclaimed that, in order
to avoid chaos and anarchy, all Muslims should obey a secular ruler, even
if demonstrably corrupt. This attitude has been dutifully followed by the
Wahhabite clerics who always supported the Saudi regime across all winds.
This unconditional support is what matters most for the Sauds who, in
exchange, easily give in to the ulamas’ puritanical opposition against inno-
vations or to their requirement that innovations be religiously justified. For
instance, it is upon the request of king Abdul Aziz that ulama close to him
had to exert themselves to find in the sacred texts a proper justification for
an innovation as fundamental as photography. This innovation was even-
tually accepted, despite the idolatry of pictorial art, on the ground that it
brings together light and shadow, which are both divine creations (Nomani
and Rahnema, 1994, p. 139). Similar efforts were deployed to allow the
introduction of the wireless into the kingdom (Feldman, 2008, p. 97). By
contrast, the prohibitions originating in the deep-rooted patriarchal values
of the Bedouin society, such as the prohibition of driving for women, face
much more resistance against change in spite of the heavy cost they impose
on the country’s economy (the husbands are forced to spend hours every
day ferrying wives to and from work and, when this is not feasible, drivers
must be hired for the purpose). 20 To sum up, because the country is im-
mensely rich owing to its abundant oil resources, efficiency costs entailed
by the tactic of co-opting religious clerics are not perceived as a problem
by the autocrat.
Kemalist Turkey
Our second example is in complete contrast to the first one: Turkey is
poorly endowed with natural resources so that the return to reforms for
the ruler is relatively high. Accession to power of a more reformist leader
20It is only very recently (February 2012) that a royal order stipulated that women
who drive should not be prosecuted by the courts (Economist, March 3-9, 2012: 56).
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is predicted not only to yield more reforms at equilibrium, but also to in-
crease political instability as a result of a reduced mass of co-opted clerics.
Our analysis shows that with a decentralized religion, indeed, the autocrat
has always the option to push many reforms by disregarding a fraction of
the clerics. The Kemalist republic provides an apt illustration of this case.
The movement of the Young Turks and the regime of Atatu¨rk were deter-
mined to bring radical reforms with a view to modernizing the country. In
retrospect, these reforms marked a major turning point in the modern his-
tory of Turkey, ending her relative stagnation vis-a`-vis the Western world
and laying the basis for long-term economic growth (Kuran, 2011). Thus,
unlike the Tanzimat reforms of the late Ottoman Empire which resulted
in the coexistence of secular and Islamic schools, courts, and laws, institu-
tional change under Kemalism ended up suppressing autonomous Islamic
institutions.21
Even before the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in October
1923, major changes had been brought to key institutions. Most noticeably,
in spite of the strong resistance of the ulama, the role of Islam had been
limited almost exclusively to the realm of family law. When the Swiss
civil code and the Italian penal code were eventually adopted in 1926, this
restricted domain of the law was taken away from the jurisdiction of the
ulama, and religious associations were banned.
Under the presidency of Mustapha Kemal, the educational system be-
came completely secularised in 1924, implying the abolition of the madrasas,
or religious colleges. Also abolished was the Ministry of Religious Affairs
and Pious Foundations which was replaced by two directorates, one for
religious affairs (the Diyanet) and the other for pious foundations (the
Evkaf), both attached directly to the prime minister’s office. Imams and
muftis became civil servants while the Diyanet was given sole responsibility
for religious guidance. This implied that the contents of Friday sermons
21Designed to arrest the decline of the Ottoman empire, the Tanzimat reforms (1839-
1876) focused on measures to graft European institutions on Ottoman ones. These
included steps toward the centralization of state authorities, the promulgation of a
Commercial Code, a Code for Land Property and a Criminal Code, the freeing of access
to public schools and functions for non-Muslim citizens, and the modernization of the
school system.
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(preaches before Friday prayer and sermons during the prayer) became cen-
trally determined and that muftis received precise instructions about how
to advise believers. Moreover, organised prayer was forbidden in public or
private schools, and the state defined the contents of mandatory religious
instruction in public schools and of the Imam-Hatip schools created for the
purpose of training imams. These changes amounted to the greatest trans-
formation of the state bureaucracy brought under the Kemalist republic
(Zu¨rcher, 2004: 187; 2010: 145, 279-80; Kuru, 2009: 165-7, 205-11, 220;
Inalcik, 1964).
Also noticeable as a dramatic step taken by the regime to bring religion
under control was the outright suppression in 1925 of the dervish (Sufi)
orders, or mystical fraternities (the tarikats), and the widespread network
of convents and shrines associated with them (Zu¨rcher, 2004: 191-2; 2010:
136; Go¨le, 2004; Kinross, 2001: 397-404). Based on closed and secretive
networks, these religious fraternities were perceived as the hallmark of a
traditional and obscurantist culture, and as loci of local power lying beyond
the reach of a centralized government (Kinross, 2001:. 397-404). Being
excluded from the administrative integration process, the Sufi masters were
far away from the official ulama who traded-off their economic security
inside the state apparatus against their silence on all the frontal attacks
against erstwhile religious institutions. The dual nature of the religious
body was therefore reinforced and institutionalized by the modernization
process imposed by Mustapha Kemal, consistently with our theory.
To sum up, the Kemalist regime succeeded in subjugating urban, edu-
cated religious clerics and pushing through radical reforms conducive to
long-term economic growth. At the same time, it created the ground
for more political instability since, albeit officially suppressed, religious
voices were not dead and popular Islam turned into a vehicle for opposi-
tion (Zu¨rcher, 2004: 192). When the regime started to democratize, the
opposition came into the open and won a landslide victory as soon as gen-
uine democratic elections were organized in March 1994. The resounding
success of the Islamic Welfare Party (WP) of Erbakan at these elections
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marked a turning point in the history of the republic of Turkey.22 After
several attempts by the regime to ban it, the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and the renamed Justice and Development Party (AKP) proved unstop-
pable: in the 2007 elections, AKP did well in every region of the country,
and it won 47 percent of the votes overall. It thus received a stunning
mandate to run Turkey along entirely new lines (Kuru, 2009: 187).
4.2.2 Iran
In addressing the case of Iran, we need to distinguish between two peri-
ods characterized by radically different distributions of the clerics relative
to the autocrat. Under the Safavid dynasty, a great mass of clerics were
close to the ruler (i.e., the density function of the clerics’ preference was
decreasing), giving rise to a successful cooperation between state and reli-
gion and thereby facilitating the emergence of a strong, modern centralized
state in the country. Under the Qajars, by contrast, the opposite situation
prevailed: a great mass of the clerics were antagonistic to the state, which
created acute tensions between the two agencies. This second phase, which
was the consequence of a prolonged period of quasi-anarchy and state vac-
uum following the demise of the Safavids, illustrates the clerics’ ability to
oppose and destabilize an autocrat.
Successful cooperation between state and religion during the Safavid rule
The Safavids (1501-1722), coming from a tribe of foreign origin, largely
succeeded in building a strong and centralized state that created political
stability and economic prosperity in a country where a large part of the
population was made of nomadic tribes in control of powerful militia. One
important feature of the Safavid rule was the recruitment of members of
the old Persian-speaking bureaucracy who had gained a lot of experience in
administration and tax collection under the previous dynasties, as well as
of Persian landlords and merchants. Another important feature is that re-
22The WP’s success resulted in part from its respect for the more conservative lifestyle
and culture of the masses. Regarding the latter aspect, its main role was to have opened
the way for a”’Muslim cultural renaissance” that dares express itself publicly, and for a
restored dignity of the Black Turks in the face of senior military officers and traditional
Republican elites entrenched in state institutions and monopolies (White, 2013, p. 47).
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ligion was made subservient to the objective of building and consolidating
a strong, prosperous state. Toward that purpose, they decided to import
some official Twelver theologians from nearby Arabic-speaking lands. Hav-
ing few ties with the local population and benefiting from the financial and
political largesse of the ruler (they received ample material privileges), these
learned men quickly became a central pillar of political support for the new
regime with which they were strongly identified. Muslim associations were
simultaneously turned into ”virtual departments of the state” (Lapidus,
1988: 882). As a consequence of such strategic choices, the egalitarianism
of their early tribal followers was gradually abandoned, and extremist ideas
were banned to leave room for a strictly enforced Shia Twelver orthodoxy.
As part of this ideology, the Safavids cursed the first three caliphs consid-
ered holy by the Sunnis, and they claimed descent from the Seventh imam
which gave them impeccable religious credentials (Keddie, 2003: 10-15).23
As pointed out by Keddie (2003), one of the main reasons why Isma’il
and his followers chose to cause a split between Sunnis and Twelver Shi’is
was to endow Iran with a specific ideological distinction and national iden-
tity vis-a`-vis its (Sunni) military-political enemies, the Ottoman Empire
and, for a time, the Central Asian Uzbeks (p. 11). In the words of Robert
Lee (2014), ”Political decisions and opportunities have recast a version
of Islam (Twelver Shiism) from a passivist, minority stance into a badge
of national identity, a religious establishment like no other in the Muslim
world, ... and an authoritarian effort to promote religion” (169). The con-
sequences of the split between two main strands of Islam now viewed by
each other as heretics and enemies, have been carried over into the present
time.
The post-Safavid collapse and emergence of religious oppositional force
After more than two centuries of stable rule, for a variety of complex
reasons that are still not well understood, the Safavid state suddenly col-
lapsed. In the aftermath, while chaos predominated owing to continuous
warfare between contending tribal confederations, the co-opted ulama fell
23Unfortunately, as pointed out by Hodgson (1974), little is known about the Safavid
period and, in particular, no precise evidence is available regarding the manner in which
the Safavid rulers interacted with the clerics.
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from their previous position of privilege and wealth, and their religious en-
dowments (tax-free grants of wealth and land to mosques, religious schools
and shrines) were confiscated or plundered. As a consequence, many of
them emigrated to southern Iraq and India or elsewhere (Axworthy, 2013:
20), causing a significant shift in the distribution of the clerics. This marked
the end of the unrestricted cooperation between the Iranian autocrats and
the religious authorities.
The Qajar dynasty was eventually consolidated (1794) to remain (nom-
inally) in power until the 1920s (Katouzian, 2009: Chap. 6). During the
times of the Qajars, a modicum of order had been re-established yet the
Qajar Shahs never succeeded in recreating a strong centralised state as
the Safavids had done (Katouzian, 2009: 129; Cleveland, 2004: 55; Yapp,
1987: 170). Administrative instability, insecurity and low legitimacy result-
ing from widespread corruption and little concern for the people’s welfare
were the hallmarks of most of their rule. When the Qajar rulers decided to
bring reforms, these reached only a small elite but did not touch the mass
of the population. Moreover, in many instances the reforms were simply
ineffective, inadequate for the centralisation of state power, and insufficient
to oppose foreign encroachment (Lapidus, 1988: 575).
Several unfortunate acts of foreign economic policy thus gave the ulama
the opportunity to act as effective leaders of the opposition against an un-
popular regime.24 In 1890 the corrupt and inefficient government of Nasir
al-Din awarded a British capitalist (G.F. Talbot) the exclusive right to pro-
duce, sell and export the country’s entire tobacco crop. Since tobacco was
such a vital commodity in the economy, this decision immediately aroused
tumultuous mass protests (Keddie, 1966; Rodinson, 1966: 166; Lapidus,
24In 1872 the government of Mirza Hosain Khan granted to a British baron, Julius
De Reuter, an extensive concession involving exclusive rights for an impressive array
of economic activities. Lord Curzon called it ”the most complete and extraordinary
surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that had
probably ever been dreamed of” (cited from Keddie, 2003, p. 54). Following protests
by a mixed group of patriotic officials, ulama, and economic agents hurt by the reforms,
the shah felt eventually compelled to annul the concession and to dismiss his prime
minister. However, a new series of economic concessions of a similar kind were soon to
follow, testifying that Iran continued to fall prey to British and Russian interests. Since
they brought only small returns to the government, while bribes to the shah and his
clique were quite large, tensions between the state and society remained high.
39
1988: 576-77; Cleveland, 2004; Gleave, 2005; Katouzian, 2009: 163-64).
Popular demonstrations were organized by members of the Shia ulama who
”urged the population to join them in preserving the dignity of Islam in the
face of growing foreign influences; they portrayed the shah’s concession as
a transgression of the laws of Islam and used their independent power base
to denounce the government” (Cleveland, 2004: 115; Mottahedeh, 2000:
35-37). This was a significant moment in modern Iran’s history not only
because the Tobacco Protest was the first successful mass protest against
government policy, but also because it rested on the coordinated actions
of ulama, secular or modernist reformers, bazaaris (especially merchants),
and ordinary townspeople.25 In this process, the higher-level ulamas, the
mujtahids, gained increasing influence and authority, and ”there was now a
clear doctrinal basis for appeals to the ulama over the head of a ruler, and
for claims by the leading mujtahid to make political decisions, provided they
touched on Islamic principles, independently of temporal rulers” (Keddie,
2003: 20; see also Axworthy, 2013: 21). These powers were increasingly
used from the early nineteenth century onwards.
It is important to stress that, although the religious officialdom in Iran
looks like a vertical hierarchy evoking the Catholic church, the reality is
different. The reunion of the clerics around their central authority figure,
when it happens, appears as the endogenous outcome of the surrounding
political environment rather than as a structural trait. As was plainly
revealed during the constitutional crisis of 1904-5, when the role of the
parliament was heavily debated, many clerics disagreed about the config-
uration of the future social and political order (Hodgson, 1974: 303-16).
Disagreement was even more pronounced during the critical decades of the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s when the doctrines of political Shi’ism born in the
seminaries in Najaf (Iraq) were being discussed. The conservative cleri-
cal establishment of Iran resisted against the idea that Shi’ism needed to
definitely abandon its erstwhile apolitical, passive and quietist approach
25Whereas before most secularist reformists, typically educated people influenced by
Western ideas, had been rather hostile to the ulama, -which contrasts with the tradition-
ally close ties between ulama and the bazaar classes-, from 1890 onwards they started
to reconcile with the clerics willing to fight against the regime’s policies, particularly
against the sale of Iran’s resources to foreigners.
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and the associated attitudes of resignation, fatalism and self-pity (Crooke,
2009: 95-6).
4.2.3 Iraq
An interesting static-comparative result derived from our theory concerns
the evolution of the autocrat’s policy when the clerics become harder to co-
opt (say, because of a rise of the parameters W or v). The theory predicts
that the autocrat will reduce the pace of reforms to the effect that the
fraction of clerics supporting him becomes higher. It is even possible that
his response to radicalization is to co-opt the whole clerical body. Reforms
are sacrificed in the name of political stability. Below we examine the case
of modern Iraq, where a series of shocks had the effect of radicalizing the
clerics.
The initial situation
Post-independent Iraq quickly adopted an authoritarian model of gov-
ernance justified by a romantic view of pan-Arabic unity and a sort of
socialist approach to development (Makiya, 1998: 208-9). General Abd al-
Karim Qasim, who led the 1958 revolution against the Hashemite monar-
chy established by the British colonial power, imposed state control over
all the Islamic institutions in the country. In this case, it meant keeping
the ulama out of politics, and Islam out of regime ideology and, as much
as possible, out of state education, culture, the legal system, and state
symbolism (Baram, 2014: 47). A genuinely progressive leader, Qasim in-
troduced a Law of Personal Status that, while based on the sharia for the
most part, drew inspiration from the European law on some key aspects
(polygamy was banned and complete gender equality was proclaimed in
respect of inheritance). He did not bend in front of the pressures exerted
by the highest religious authority.
Under Saddam Husayn, who seized power through brutal force, the
regime oscillated between progressive moves and reactionary steps.26 Sad-
26An example of a progressive measure was the introduction in the Law of Personal
status of a new provision forbidding forced marriage. An example of a reactionary
measure was the lowering of the minimum age of marriage from sixteen to fifteen years
in order to placate the conservative (mainly tribal) circles (Baram, 2014: 57).
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dam was eager not to antagonise the official clergy and, besides appointing
to positions of responsibility Shi’i clerics whom he wanted to draw into the
network of his patronage, he paid lip service to Islamic values whenever the
opportunity arose (Tripp, 2000: 209-11).
The shocks and its aftermath
An important turning point was reached toward the end of the 1970s
and the early 1980s when major changes occurred in the international en-
vironment of the country, starting with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini to
power in Iran (1979) and the subsequent stirrings of a Shia revolt in Iraq.
These two events caused a sudden radicalization of the clerics, particu-
larly among the Shi’ites: religious clerics became less reluctant to assert
their views, including criticisms against the regime. Saddam’s response
consisted of what Baram (2014) calls ”a revised, ’Shi’ified’ version of his
earlier blood-and-soil nationalism adapted to the political necessity of the
time” (63). A first step in Saddam’s about-face coincided with the 9th
Congress of the Regional Command of the Baath (1982) on the occasion
of which the significance of religion, together with the primacy of Iraq,
was stressed with special vigour (Tripp, 2000: 228). His seductive tactics
was especially geared toward the Shi’ites who formed the bulk of his con-
script army which he had engaged in disastrous wars with Iran and later
with Kuwait. It included the rebuilding of Shia mosques and places of
pilgrimage, the declaring of Iraqi territory as sacred because it contained
the soil of Najaf and Karbala (the two Shi’a holy cities), the imposition of
the birthday of the fourth caliph, the imam Ali, as a national holiday, and
the extravagant proclamation that he, Saddam, was a descendant of this
central figure for all Shia Muslim believers (Tripp, 2000: 238; Polk, 2005:
12; Baram, 2014: 63, 207-8; Benraad, 2015: 76-77).
In a second step, new laws sometimes providing for barbaric penalties
were also enacted. Thus, in March 1992, the regime cracked down on night-
clubs and discothe`ques, imposed Ramadan fasting, outlawed prostitution
(punishable by death) and banned public alcohol consumption, allowing
only non-Muslims to sell spirits. More ominously, in 1994, amputation of
the hand at the wrist was introduced to punish theft and robbery, which
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had become widespread as a result of the deepening economic crisis, and
amputation of the left foot at the ankle was to sanction second offenses.
Subsequent decrees enlarged the definition of theft and robbery to make the
draconic punishments applicable to unauthorized money changers, forgers
of official documents, merchants, and profiteering bakers (Dawisha, 2009:
238; Baram, 2014: 265-7, 321).
Finally, in a third step, the Islamization of the regime’s rhetoric grad-
ually intensified and culminated in the so-called ”Campaign for the Faith”
(1993-2003), which did seriously affect the legal and educational system.
Saddam first embarked upon a massive educational effort to impose the
study of the Quran and the hadith, starting from the first grade of pri-
mary school and doubling or tripling the amount of time devoted to it in
all Iraqi schools. Separation between boys and girls at school was imposed
from the same initial grade. Saddam even forced the senior party members
to take Quran classes lasting up to two years, and he gave the reciting
of the Quran a dominant place in the educational system (Baram, 2014:
220-1, 254-8). Finally, women’s status, which had improved remarkably
during the first decades of the Ba’ath revolution, especially under Quasim,
suffered a frontal attack at the height of the campaign: they were thus
prohibited from travelling abroad unless accompanied by a male relative
from the paternal side of their immediate family. In complete contradiction
with his 1977 declaration that the sharia was irrelevant to modern life, and
with his early commitment to the ideal of a national, secular, united Arab
mega-state, Saddam now contended that Islam, rather than Arabism and
the Arab culture, could be the cement holding the future state together.
All these steps, which amounted to a repudiation of the values of mod-
ernism and secularism, had the calculated advantage of pleasing senior
Sunni and less senior Shia clerics whose prestige and material status were
given a major boost. In the words of Baram (2014): ”by upgrading their
socioeconomic status, he [Saddam] could hope to buy off the clerics, and
through them gain much-needed public support. In light of his expressed
dislike of any and all clerics, this policy can only be seen as a cynical step...”
(257; see also 323). The key fact is that the stability of his regime was un-
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der serious threat and that appeals to religion appeared to be the easiest
way of preserving it.
5 Conclusion
Whether religion can stand in the way of progressive reforms and slow down
long-term economic development is a question of considerable importance
as attested by the present-day re-assertion of religious values and identity
in parts of the developing world and the growing interest in religion among
social scientists, including economists. Although the latter have started to
explore empirically the relationship between politics and religion, and Islam
has received special attention, few attempts have been made to investigate
it theoretically. This paper, which represents a first effort to fill up this
gap, is based on the idea that religious clerics have special attributes which,
in the context of traditional societies, may transform them into effective
organizers of popular rebellion. At the same time, they are vulnerable
to co-option by autocrats preoccupied by the duration of their rule. We
study the trade-off between the level of progressive reforms and political
stability under an autocratic regime when clerics are heterogeneous in terms
of their income-ideology preferences. These preferences reflect the intensity
of the clerics’ attachment to moral principles and institutions associated
with their religion or, equivalently, they indicate the amount of (material)
compensation they require to forsake (or betray) their values.
How the level of progressive reforms and the degree of political stability
are influenced by the presence of heterogeneous clerics critically depends
not only on the shape of the clerics’ distribution but more importantly
on whether their religion is centralized or decentralized. Two important
results deserve special mention. First, given a decentralized religion, a
reform-minded autocrat may choose to co-opt only a fraction of the cler-
ical body so as not to sacrifice too many reforms. This is more likely to
happen if the clerics’ aversion to reforms is not too high compared to the
return of reform efforts from the autocrat’s standpoint. In the opposite
case, the autocrat prefers political stability to reforms. Second, in condi-
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tions of political stability, an autocrat will choose a higher level of reforms
under a centralized than under a decentralized religion. If, under a de-
centralized religion, he chooses incomplete co-option of the clerics so that
political stability is not guaranteed, he may well opt for a larger amount
of reforms than under religious centralization. Comparative-static results
offer interesting insights, particularly under the condition of religious de-
centralization. In the light which they provide, the role of Saudi Arabia
in the modern Islamic world appears especially pernicious. On the one
hand, by causing a low return of reforms, the abundance of oil resources
prompted the Saudi rulers to privilege political stability and forge a strong
alliance with a very conservative brand of Islam (Wahhabism). On the
other hand, thanks to their immense wealth, these rulers could actively
disseminate the Wahhabite doctrine throughout the Muslim world, using
it as a potent vehicle of their geopolitical influence. As a result, religious
clerics in the host Sunnite countries became more radicalized and harder
to co-opt. Such a change led their autocratic rulers to reduce the pace of
reforms or even adopt regressive steps in order to placate the men of reli-
gion. The coexistence of oil wealth and a puritan religion in Saudi Arabia
thus gave rise to conservative policies not only in that country itself but
also in a large number of other countries where it extended its influence.
A final remark concerns the applicability of our theoretical framework
to non-religious agencies, ethnic groups in particular. Assume that there
exists a continuum of tribal leaders who represent different tribes, clans or
sub-clans. They stand for different traditions and different levels of dis-
agreement with the autocrat’s policies. Yet, they can be co-opted by him.
In this setup, centralization corresponds to a tribal confederation that has
succeeded in overcoming the collective action problem of dispersed tribal
leadership. All the predictions derived from our model would then apply.
There are two important shortcomings of such a straightforward applica-
tion of our theory to ethnicity, though. First, the tribal confederation is
likely to be an unstable feature of the polity. Second, the identity of the
autocrat is left undefined. In reality, the autocrat must himself belong a
particular ethnic group or clan and his policies are expected to promote
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its particularistic interests. Being thus marked, he cannot claim to adhere
to, and draw legitimacy from, a national ideology that transcends tribal
or clanish identities. As a consequence, the polity is inherently conflict-
ual and political stability can never be achieved. In fact, varying levels of
antagonism of tribal leaders vis-a`-vis the autocrat tend to arise from the
ethnic distance between their own group and that of the autocrat. Bearing
these qualifications in mind, it does not appear coincidental that reference
to a universal religion has often been a strategy followed by autocrats to
overcome tribalism.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If the autocrat chooses the corner solution θd = 1, he maximizes maxG(α)−
aV (α) with respect to α, where a ≥ 1. Since V ′′(α) ≥ 0 and G′′(α) ≤ 0
the autocrat’s objective function is concave. The first-order condition is
therefore sufficient. The optimal solution, then, is α∗a so that
G′(α)
V ′(α) =
1
a
,
where a is the minimum value of w/V (α) ensuring that the corner solution
holds. We deduce that w = V (α)
V ′(α)G
′(α), which is identical to (14). In
words, the autocrat chooses the same structure of wage whether he decides
to enlist the full or the partial support of the clerical class.
Let us now look at the interior solution, where α is conjointly deter-
mined with θ in (11) and (12). We need to check the second-order condi-
tions in order to prove the result. Deriving ∂U
p
∂α
in (12) with respect to α
yields:
∂2Up
∂α2
= F (θd)G′′(α)− V ′′(α)θd (19)
Since G(α) is concave and V (α) convex, we deduce that ∂
2Up
∂α2
≤ 0.
Deriving ∂U
p
∂θ
in (11) with respect to θ yields:
∂2Up
∂θ2
= G(α)f ′(θd). (20)
The local second-order condition holds if and only if f ′(θd) ≤ 0. With a
decreasing density function, this is always true. With a a U-shaped density
function, we will have ∂
2Up
∂θ2
≤ 0 as long as θd ≤ θ, where θ is the minimum
point of f(θ) (i.e., θ is such that f ′(θ) = 0). On the other hand, it is
straightforward that, with an increasing density function, the condition
will never hold. With such a density, the interior equilibrium is always
55
unstable: this is a case where the autocrat tries to get the support of the
whole clerical group. The relevant equilibrium is the corner one.
Finally, in order to get an interior solution, we also need to check that
w < G(α), which is equivalent to V (α)
V ′(α) <
G(α)
G′(α) . For instance this condition
holds if G(α) = K α
g
g
, and V (α) = W α
v
v
, with K,W > 0 and 0 < g < 1 ≤ v.
6.2 Comparative Statics
We next show that dθ
d
dα
≤ 0. To prove this result note that θd defined in (4)
is such that V (α)
w
F (θ) = θ. Then dθ
d
dα
=
− d(
V (α)
w )
dα
f(θ)
V (α)
w
−1 . The way θ
d evolves in
equilibrium as α increases thus depends on the sign of
d(V (α)
w
)
dα
. By virtue
of Proposition 1, we know that V (α)
w
= V
′(α)
G′(α) , which implies:
d(V (α)
w
)
dα
=
V ′′(α)
G′(α)
− G
′′(α)V ′(α)
(V ′(α))2
≥ 0. (21)
We deduce that dθ
d
dα
≤ 0. For instance, if G(α) = K αg
g
, and V (α) = W α
v
v
,
with K,W > 0 and 0 < g < 1 ≤ v, then V (α)
w
= Wα
v−g
K
, which increases in
α as v − g > 0.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that G(α) = K α
g
g
, and V (α) = W α
v
v
, with v ≥ 1 > g > 0 and
K,W > 0. We deduce that (14) is equivalent to
w =
K
v
αg. (22)
Substituting this value as well as the value of G(α) in the autocrat’s utility
function yields
UP = F (θd)
v − g
vg
Kαg. (23)
The autocrat needs to choose α so as to optimize his utility function. He
needs to compare different regimes. In the first one, he chooses a relatively
low level of reform so that stability is maximal, θd = 1. In the second
regime, he chooses to implement more reforms (a larger level of α) at the
cost of higher instability: θd < 1. We next show that we can get an interior
solution or a corner solution depending on the values of the parameters v
and g.
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6.3.1 Symmetrical U-shaped distributions
We first prove the result for a symmetrical U-shaped density function. The
density function has two peaks for θ ∈ [0, 1], one at θ = 0 and the other
one at θ = 1, and it reaches its minimum value at θ = 0.5.
Let focus first on the corner solution. There is a threshold value a > 1 so
that the only stable equilibrium is θd = 1 whenever w
V (α)
≥ a. For instance
with the density function f(θ) = 2 − 6θ + 6θ2 defined over θ ∈ [0, 1] and
c.d.f. F (θ) = 2θ − 3θ2 + 2θ3, the threshold is a = 8
7
. In the general
case, the optimal solution αθd=1 is such that
G′(α)
V ′(α) = a. We deduce that
αθd=1 =
(
1
a
K
W
) 1
v−g and
UPθd=1 =
v − g
vg
K
(
1
a
K
W
) g
v−g
. (24)
Second, the autocrat might choose α so that he obtains an interior
solution for θd ∈ [0, 1), and F (θd) ∈ [0, 1). The principal will accept a lower
probability of staying in power only if it comes with a higher payoff. That
is, he chooses the interior over the corner solution only if the payoff G(α)−
w = v−g
vg
Kαg is higher under the former regime. Since it is impossible to
find closed-form solutions of the autocrat’s optimization problem, we show
that for some value of the parameters, an arbitrarily chosen interior value
θ ∈ (0, 1) so that θ = F (θ) dominates the corner solution.27 It implies
that, when the principal actually optimizes, he will do better than for θ,
and hence will always prefer the interior solution.
If the autocrat wants to co-opt F (θ) of the clerics, he must offer a
ratio ”cost of reform/wage” equal to V (α)
w
= 1. The solution α∗∗ to this
constrained problem is such that G
′(α)
V ′(α) = 1. We deduce that α
∗∗ =
(
K
W
) 1
v−g
and
UPθ = F (θ)
v − g
vg
K
(
K
W
) g
v−g
. (25)
Comparing (24) and (25), it is easy to check that
UPθ > U
P
θd=1 ⇔ F (θ)
v−g
g >
1
a
. (26)
27With symmetrical U-shaped density, we have θ = 0.5. However this part of the
proof is independent of the symmetry of the distribution (i.e., it holds even if θ 6= 0.5).
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Condition (26) is equivalent to v
g
< 1 + lna−ln(F (θ)) . Since
lna
−ln(F (θ)) > 0 (i.e.,
a > 1 and F (θ) ≤ 1), this inequality holds if g is sufficiently close to v so
that 0 < g < 1 ≤ v. We deduce that, for g and v sufficiently close to each
other, the interior solution dominates the corner solution. For instance,
with the density function f(θ) = 2− 6θ + 6θ2 condition (26) is equivalent
to 1
2
>
(
7
8
) g
v−g , which holds if g = 0.9 and v = 1, for example.
To complete the analysis, we need to show that the corner solution
may dominate the interior solution. We focus on the case where θd =
3−
√
8
V (α∗)
w∗ −7
4
=
3−
√
8
V ′(α∗)
G′(α∗)−7
4
= 1
2
, is actually the optimal interior solution.
This requires that α∗ is such that V
′(α∗)
G′(α∗) = 1, implying from (14) that
w∗ = V (α∗). Moreover, since the density function is symmetrical U-shaped,
if θd = 0.5 then F (θd) = f(θd) = 0.5. From (6), we can infer that dθ
d
dα
=
−V ′(α∗)
V (α∗) .
28 We deduce that, if θd = 0.5 is to be the optimal interior solution,
it must be the case that G(α∗) = 2V (α∗) from (13), and that V ′(α∗) =
G′(α∗). Using the explicit functions chosen and solving these two equations
simultaneously, we get that v = 2g ≥ 1 and that α∗ =
(
K
W
) 1
g
. Therefore,
w∗ = K
2
vW
.
We then need to compare the autocrat’s utility at the interior solution
θd∗ = 0.5 with his utility at the corner solution θd∗ = 1 defined in (24) for
v = 2g, that is, U∗
θd=1
= K
(
7
8
K
W
) g
v−g v−g
vg
= 7K
2
8vW
. One can easily check that
U∗
θd=1
= 7K
2
8vW
> K
2
4vW
= U∗
θd= 1
2
.
6.3.2 Decreasing distribution
With decreasing density, F (θ) is concave and there are at most two equilib-
ria and only one of them is stable. If f(0) w
V (α)
< 1, so that the slope of the
F (θ)w/V (α) function is smaller than that of the identity function at θ = 0
and, a fortiori, everywhere (since F (θ) is concave), the only equilibrium
is 0 and it is stable. If w
V (α)
≥ 1, so that the slope of the F (θ)w/V (α)
function exceeds that of the identity function at θ = 1 and, a fortiori, ev-
erywhere (since F (θ) is concave), the only stable equilibrium is 1 (and 0 is
unstable). The optimal level of reforms for the autocrat, α∗1, is then such
28Indeed we have dθ
d
dα =
−V ′(α∗)θd
V (α∗)−f(θd)w∗ =
−V ′(α∗)0.5
V (α∗)−0.5V (α∗) = −V
′(α∗)
V (α∗) .
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that G′(α) = V ′(α), and the optimal wage for the clerics is w∗1 = V (α
∗
1)
by virtue of (14). If 1
f(0)
≤ w
V (α)
< 1, so that the slope of the F (θ)w/V (α)
function is first larger, and then smaller than that of the identity function,
the only stable equilibrium is the interior one: F (θd) w
V (α)
= θd.
If the autocrat chooses the corner solution, the threshold value a so that
the only stable equilibrium is θd = 1 whenever w
V (α)
≥ a is a = 1. Indeed
with a decreasing density the c.d.f. F (θ) is increasing and concave. We
deduce that α∗
θd=1
=
(
K
W
) 1
v−g and w∗
θd=1
= W
v
(
K
W
) v
v−g , so that the autocrat’s
utility is Up∗
θd=1
= v−g
vg
W
(
K
W
) v
v−g .
If the autocrat picks up the interior solution, equations (11) and (12)
are equivalent to f(θ) = gW
vK
αv−g and F (θ)
θ
= W
K
αv−g. There is an interior
solution to this problem if and only if the θ˜ solution to F (θ)
θf(θ)
= v
g
is such
that θ˜ ∈ (0, 1). The corner solution is the only possibility otherwise. For
instance, if F (θ) = 2θ
θ+1
for θ ∈ [0, 1] so that f(θ) = 2
(θ+1)2
, then 2
(1+θ)2
=
gW
vK
αv−g and 2
1+θ
= W
K
αv−g. In this case, θ˜ = v−g
g
so that there is an interior
solution in θ if and only if g < v ≤ 2g. Let us focus on cases where
there is an interior solution θd = θ˜ ∈ (0, 1) so that α∗
θd
=
(
F (θd)
θd
K
W
) 1
v−g
.
Substituting this value in the principal’s objective function yields Up∗
θd<1
=
F (θd)v
(θd)
g
v−g
vg
W
(
K
W
) v
v−g . Comparing the latter with the utility of the autocrat
when he chooses the corner solution, one can check that Up∗
θd<1
> Up∗
θd=1
⇔
F (θd)v
(θd)
g > 1. Since F (θ) is increasing and concave, and since F (0) = 0 and
F (1) = 1, then for all θ ∈ (0, 1), it is the case that 1 > F (θ) > θ > 0.
We deduce that if v is sufficiently close to g, we have that
(F (θd))
v
(θd)
g > 1.
On the other hand, if v becomes very large,
(
F (θd)
)v
becomes very small,
and converges to 0 when v goes to infinity. In this case,
(F (θd))
v
(θd)
g < 1. This
proves the result.
For instance, if F (θ) = 2θ
θ+1
for θ ∈ [0, 1] so that f(θ) = 2
(θ+1)2
and both
the interior and the corner solutions are available (i.e., when v ≤ 2g), one
can check that Up∗
θd= v−g
g
> Up∗
θd=1
⇔ (2g−v) (2g
v
) v
v−g > v−g. This inequality
is equivalent to
(
1
ν
− 1) ν1+ν > ν+1
2
where v = (1 + ν)g and ν ∈ (0, 1]. The
left-hand side is decreasing in ν and the right-hand side is increasing in ν.
Moreover, the left-hand side goes to infinity when ν goes to 0 while the
right-hand side is then equal to 0.5. Finally, the left-hand side is equal to 0
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when ν = 1 while the right-hand side is then equal to 1. We conclude that
the functions
(
1
ν
− 1) ν1+ν and ν+1
2
cross once and only once when ν ∈ (0, 1].
We deduce the result.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We need to solve
max
w,α
(
G(α)− w
)1−c(
w − θcV (α)
)c
s.t. w ≥ EθV (α)
The Lagrangian associated to this problem is
L =
(
G(α)− w
)1−c(
w − θcV (α)
)c
+ λ
(
w − EθV (α)
)
It yields
∂L
∂α
= (1− c)G′(α)
(
w−θcV (α)
G(α)−w
)c
− cθcV ′(α)
(
G(α)−w
w−θcV (α)
)1−c
− λEθV ′(α) = 0
∂L
∂w
= −(1− c)
(
w−θcV (α)
G(α)−w
)c
+ c
(
G(α)−w
w−θcV (α)
)1−c
+ λ = 0
Moreover, we have that λ(w − EθV (α)) = 0. Two cases are possible.
1. If w > EθV (α), it follows that λ = 0 so that the solution to this
problem is wc = (1 − c)θcV (α) + cG(α) and αc such that G′(α) =
θcV ′(α). The condition w > EθV (α) is then equivalent to (1 −
c)θcV (αc) + cG(αc) > EθV (αc). Substituting θc = G
′(α)
V ′(α) and dividing
right and left by V (αc) yields Eθ < cG(α
c)
V (αc)
+ (1− c)G′(αc)
V ′(αc) . We deduce
condition 1.
2. If λ > 0, we have that w = EθV (α). We deduce from ∂L
∂w
= 0 that λ =
(1 − c)
(
(Eθ−θc)V (α)
G(α)−EθV (α)
)c
− c
(
G(α)−EθV (α)
(Eθ−θc)V (α)
)1−c
. Substituting this value
in ∂L
∂α
= 0 yields (1 − c)(G′(α) − EθV ′(α)) + cV ′(α)G(α)−EθV (α)
V (α)
= 0.
Dividing right and left by V ′(α) and simplifying yields condition 2.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 6
The autocrat who wants to obtain the full support of the clerical body in
the decentralized case will implement a level of reforms αd = α∗a so that
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G′(α)
V ′(α) = a, where a > 1 is the minimum value such that the corner solution
holds.
Under a centralized religion, according to Proposition 4, two cases are
possible. In Case 1, the head of the church is quite antagonist to the
autocrat (i.e., θc ∈ [0, 1] is relatively high), and αc must satisfy G′(α) =
θcV ′(α). Since, under the assumptions that G(α) is concave and V (α) is
convex, the function G
′(α)
V ′(α) is decreasing in α, and since a > 1 ≥ θc, we
deduce that αc > α∗a.
Under Case 2, θc is relatively small (i.e., the head of the church is
relatively close to the autocrat) and the participation constraint of the
average cleric is binding: αc is such that cG(α)
V (α)
+(1−c)G′(α)
V ′(α) = Eθ. Since in
this case, wc = EθV (αc) < G(αc), it follows that G(α
c)
V (αc)
> Eθ. We deduce
that, necessarily, G
′(αc)
V ′(αc) < Eθ since the convex combination of two numbers
larger than Eθ cannot be equal to Eθ. By the same reasoning as before,
and since Eθ < 1, we have that αc > α∗a.
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Figure 1: Decentralized religion U-shaped density
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Figure 2: Decentralized religion Decreasing density
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Figure 3: Decentralized religion Increasing density
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